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1 Introduction
In the postal sector, the practice of worksharing has been introducing a measure of com-
petition even when the industry was otherwise monopolistic. When the customers have
the possibility to “bypass” part of the postal network, there is effectively competition
in the relevant segments between the operators activities and those of the customers.
From that perspective, one can think of the processing of workshared mail as a form of
“downstream access” which is provided to the customers. The relevant question is then
to know how the workshared product ought to be priced and more generally, how the
possibility of worksharing ought to affect the operators pricing structure. This subject
has been extensively studied in the literature see Billette de Villemeur et al. (2002,
2003a).1
When the market is liberalized and when entry occurs, a new kind of demand for
workshared mail may emerge if the other operators do not have their own delivery
network, at least in some areas. The pricing of the services provided to competing
operator raises the problem of “access pricing”. The phenomenon of “downstream
access” has been heavily debated in many network industries like telecommunication,
electricity and gas, as part of the ongoing liberalization process; see for instance Laffont
and Tirole (1996, 2000) and Armstrong (2002). A few recent papers have also looked
at this problem for the postal sector, see Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) and Billette de
Villemeur et al. (2003b,c). However, these contributions neglect the more traditional
form of worksharing by customers. A fully fledged model of postal sector pricing would
have to account for both the customers and the competitors demand for workshared
mail. Panzar (2003) represents a first step in that direction. He uses the worksharing
model of Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003a) in which he introduced upstream and
downstream competition. However, he uses a rather specific setting and he does not
characterize the optimal pricing structure. The current paper tries to bring together
competitive access and monopoly worksharing models in a more systematic way.
Before proceeding it may be interesting to take a look at the fundamental issues
1See also Crew and Kleindorfer (1995), Mitchel (1999), Sherman (2001) and Panzar (2002).
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underlying our problem. The regulatory design of postal prices including those for
workshared mail is essentially a Ramsey-Boiteux pricing problem. The underlying issues
are very simple. The incumbent operator offers different products to different types of
customers and we can think of workshared mail as one of these products. While some
of these products are final goods, some like workshared mail may be intermediate goods
which are used as inputs by other firms. The pricing of this intermediate good then
indirectly determines the prices paid by the final consumers of these products. In a
“perfect” (first-best) world the pricing rules for all these products are very simple,
namely, (long-run) marginal cost for all products. This provides consumers with the
correct signals and ensures that the decentralized outcome is efficient.
In an industry like the postal sector, where technology involves “fixed” costs (like the
cost of maintaining the delivery network) it is however, typically the case that marginal
cost (even long-run marginal costs) are well below average costs.2 Strict marginal cost
pricing is then problematic because it implies that the operator cannot break even,
which is usually considered as not acceptable for a number of reasons (including political
economy considerations).3 Consequently, one would have to impose positive markups on
at least some products in order to meet the break-even constraint. The determination of
these markups is precisely what the Ramsey-Boiteux problem is all about. The question
is simply how to distort the different prices away from marginal cost in order to break-
even while keeping the efficiency cost of these distortions as small as possible. The exact
specification of this problem and hence the specific results depend on the characteristics
of the industry (costs, technology and demand) the general regulatory environment
(e.g., the presence of a uniform pricing constraint) and on the type of competition
there is between the incumbent and the entrant(s) (competitive fringe, monopolistic
competition, some form of oligopoly, etc.). The literature so far has concentrated on
the competitive fringe case for which a number of interesting results have been obtained.4
2Like most of the regulation literature we use the term fixed cost for the part of cost which is
independant of output, even in the long run.
3 In a first-best setting this problem can be overcome by a lump-sum tranfer to the operator covering
its fixed cost.
4See e.g., Cremer et al. (1995, 1997), Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), De Donder et al. (2002, 2003),
Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003b).
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Pricing rules for final goods and for workshared mail are typically inverse-elasticity rules,
properly amended to account for cross-price effects (if any). Consequently, optimal
prices depend on demand consideration and not just on cost considerations. This is
different from the first best setting where prices simply reflect marginal costs. In a
recent contribution, Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003c) show that these rules can be
generalized to account for imperfect competition
Summing up, it appears that the economists’ toolbox regarding pricing in the postal
sector, though still in need to be expanded, does already have the potential to offer
valuable guidance in the regulatory debate. In many instances, however, all these studies
are ignored by the various parties involved, regulators and postal representatives alike.
Instead, the debate concentrates on the relative merits of two essentially ad hoc rules (or
classes of rules). The first of these ad hoc approaches is the so called Efficient Component
Pricing Rule (ECPR) which (roughly speaking) consists in applying the same (per unit)
markup on workshared that is applied on the corresponding final product offered by
the incumbent operator. Consequently, worksharing per se does not appear to affect
the incumbent’s profits and more generally its ability to cover its fixed costs. This
rule has the theoretical merit that it leads (under some conditions) to efficient entry
decisions: entry occurs if and only if the entrant is more efficient. However, these
apparent properties often do not stand under closer scrutiny because ECPR does not
account for the demand side of the problem. Further, the rule is incomplete and does
not explain how the markup on the incumbent’s relevant final product ought to be
determined. In addition and most significantly, it does not in general yield an efficient
Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, even when one ignores the determination of all the other prices.
Another ad hoc rule which is sometimes advocated by regulators (for instance in
the UK) is a “cost-plus” rule, where the access price is obtained from the long run
marginal cost by applying some ad hoc markup. This may at first sound similar to
a Ramsey-Boiteux approach and there exists of course a specific level of the markup
for which we obtain the Ramsey price (or alternatively the ECPR level). The crucial
difference, however, is that no effort in made to optimize the markup by accounting for
instance for demand considerations. Instead the markup is set in a ad hoc way. For
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instance a small markup is added in order to cover the cost of universal service which
in turn is calculated in a questionable way (and thus often significantly underestimated;
see Cremer et al. (2000)). There is no reason to expect that such a procedure can yield
anything which comes close to the optimal prices.
The main features of our setting are as follows. We consider a stylized representation
of the postal sector, with two activities (e.g. distribution and a composite activity) and
two types of operators: the incumbent universal service operator on the one hand and
the potential entrants on the other hand. There are two types of customers and at
least three different products. Households consume single piece mail which uses the
entire network. Business customers may or may not engage in worksharing depending
on the price structure. Business customers can also consume the entrant’s product. The
incumbent operator processes workshared mail which emanated both from its customers
and from the competitors. The incumbent’s and the entrants’ product may or may not
be perfect substitutes.
We start by characterizing the first-best allocation which essentially involves mar-
ginal cost pricing. Consequently, differences in prices reflect solely differences in mar-
ginal costs. Then we proceed to a more realistic setting where a fixed network cost has
to be covered through the pricing scheme.
Our model can be used to study a number of settings depending on the specific
assumptions which are made on demand, costs and on the regulatory environment.
The current paper is meant to be a first step and we concentrate on a very stylized
setting. Specifically, we assume throughout that the entrant does not deliver (there is
no bypass). We also concentrate on the case where the access price for competitors
is restricted to equal the rate charged for workshared mail to customers. We make
no specific assumption at first on the degree of product differentiation between the
incumbents’ and entrant’s product. However, we also look at the special case of perfect
substitutes for which crisper results emerge.
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2 Model
2.1 Operators, customers and preferences
There are two operators: the incumbent universal service operator I and an entrant E.
The stylized postal network we consider consists of two segments. Segment 1 corresponds
to a composite activity including collecting, sorting and transportation. This activity
implies a constant marginal cost of c1 for operator I and of kE for operator E. Segment
2 is delivery. Operator I’s marginal delivery cost is c2; Operator E does not have its
own delivery network. In addition, there is a fixed cost of F I > 0 for operator I and
FE ≥ 0 for operator E.
There are two types of senders and two goods. The nh senders of type h (households)
consume good x which is supplied by I and uses both segments. The marginal cost of x
is thus given by c1 + c2. The nf customers of type f may or may not use segment 1 of
operator I’s network. If they do not use segment 1 they consume good z which implies




according to the cumulative
distribution G(k) with density g(k). Observe that c2 is the operator’s cost, while k is
directly born by the customer. Alternatively, they can consume good x for which they
pay the same price as households,5 or good y supplied by operator E. Prices are given
by px and pz for operator I and by py for operator E.
Let Sh(xh) denote the (gross) surplus of a households, while Sf (xf + z, y, k) repre-
sents the (gross) surplus of a sender of type f with characteristic k.6 Observe that k
represents not only the preparation cost, but also determines surplus and hence demand.
Net surplus is obtained by subtracting total cost: payment to the operator plus cost of
activity 1, if applicable. The demand function for a household is given by:
xh (p) = argmax
x
{Sh (x)− px} . (1)
5Except for the cost difference x and z are considered as perfect substitutes.
6For simplicity we use surplus as a welfare measure for firms. From a strict welfare economics point of
view, this can be understood as representing the surplus of the consumers who buy the goods produced
by firms f which use postal services as inputs. One can easily show that our shortcut does not involve
any loss of generality in the case where all downstream markets are competitive.
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The demand functions of the representative sender f are obtained by maximizing
Sf (xf + z, y, k)− pxxf − (pz + k)z − pyy
s.t xf , z > 0.
To characterize the solution to this problem define ek = px−pz. This yields the demand
functions:(
xf (px, py, k) and y(px, py, k) when k > ek (so that pz + k > px)
z(pz + k, py, k) and y(pz + k, py, k) when k ≤ ek (so that pz + k ≤ px).
To understand the determination of the demand functions, note that all users of
type f for which pz + k ≤ px (i.e., when k ≤ px − pz = ek) find it profitable to buy
good z (rather than x) at a level z(pz + k, py, k). Overall per-unit cost of z is equal
to pz + k; it is this overall cost rather than just pz which determines demand. On
the other hand, when pz + k > px, it is cheaper to consume x (which is otherwise a
perfect substitute of z) and demand is xf (px, py, k). Observe that when pz + k = px
we have xf (px, py, k) = z(pz + k, py, k); this property arises because, except of cost
considerations, x and z are perfect substitutes. Either way, the firms may also consume
the (differentiated) product offered by E, at levels specified by y(·).
Substituting demand functions into net surplus yields the following indirect utility
functions:
Vh (px) = Sh [xh (px)]− pxxh (px) , (2a)
Vf (px, pz, py, k) =

Sf [z(pz + k, py, k), y(pz + k, py, k), k]
− (pz + k) z(pz + k, py, k)− pyy(pz + k, py, k)
if pz + k ≤ px,
Sf [xf (px, py, k), y(pz + k, py, k)]
−pxxf (px, py, k)− pyy(pz + k, py, k)
if pz + k > px.
(2b)
2.2 Market demand, cost and profits
We are now in a position to determine market demand functions for the various (final)
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goods. The aggregate demand functions for the incumbent products are:
X (px, pz, py) = nhxh (px) + nf
Z k
px−pz
xf (px, py, k)g (k) dk (3)
Z (px, pz, py) = nf
Z px−pz
k
z(pz + k, py, k)g (k) dk (4)
The demand function for the operator E is:
Y (px, pz, py) = nf
Z px−pz
k




y(py, px, k)g (k) dk (5)
Expression (3) provides the total demand for the incumbent’s single piece mail. The
first term on the RHS of this expression is the total demand by households, while the
second term represents the total demand by the firms who do not workshare their mail
(those with high levels of k). Expression (4) gives the firms’ total demand for commercial
(workshared) mail. It is the sum of individual demand levels for the firm with a low
level of k. Finally, equation (5) represents the demand level for the entrants product.
This demand potentially emanates from all firms; however, we do not rule out the case
where y = 0 for some firms and especially those with a low level of k. This will of course
be particularly relevant when the products are close substitutes; see the case of perfect
substitutes below.
For the remainder of the paper, it is important to keep in mind that these demand
levels are for final products (as opposed to intermediate goods). Since operator E does
not deliver, Y will also be delivered through the incumbent’s network. Consequently,
the total (final and intermediate) demand for the incumbent’s workshared mail will
effectively be equal to Z + Y .
Per the assumptions introduced in subsection 2.1 we can write the costs functions
as follows.






Y + FE (7)
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To understand these expressions, recall that marginal costs are constant, that X used
both segments of the network, while the (Z + Y ) units workshared mail only use the de-
livery network. Then entrant pays pz in lieu of the delivery cost and it has a preparation
cost of kE (rather than c1 for the incumbent).
Finally, profits can be expressed as follows.
πI = pxX + pz (Z + Y )− CI ,
= [px − (c1 + c2)]X + [pz − c2] (Z + Y )− F I , (8)







Y − FE . (9)
Observe that both costs and profits can be expressed as functions of prices (and of
the exogenous cost parameters). To obtain these functions is is sufficient to substitute
aggregate demand functions (3)—(5) in the expressions for costs and profits (6)—(9).
Our formal analysis concentrates on the competitive fringe case, where E price at
marginal cost so that py = kE + pz. This assumption is of course only meaningful if we
assume FE = 0.
3 First-best solution
The first-best solution constitutes an interesting benchmark. To obtain it, we maximize
total surplus which is given by
W = Vh (px) +
Z k
k
Vf (px, pz, py, k) + π
I (px, pz, py) + π
E (px, pz, py) , (10)
with respect to prices (px, pz, py) . The result is well known and we skip the deriva-
tion here.7 Differentiating (10) with respect to (px, pz, py) and rearranging yields the
following solution:
px = c1 + c2, (11)
pz = c2, (12)
py = k
E + c2. (13)
7 It can be obtained from expressions (27)—(28) in the Appendix by setting λ = 0.
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In words, all prices are set at marginal cost. Event though these expressions are stan-
dard, it has to be pointed out that they have an number of interesting implications in
our setting.
First, we can think about px−pz as the “worksharing discount”. From (11) and (12)
it follows immediately that this discount is simply equal to c1, that is the avoided cost.
This in turn implies that we have “production efficiency” in the sense that a firm will
workshare its mail if and only if its preparation cost is less than that of the operator.
To see this recall that all firms with k < ek = px − pz consume workshared mail and
under marginal cost pricing this reduces to k < c2.
Second, we have assumed from the outset that pz represents both the discounted
price charged to customers and the access price charged to the competitor. Put dif-
ferently, price discrimination between competitors and customers has been ruled out.
It is interesting to note that in a first-best setting this does not effectively impose a
restriction. Since the (marginal) delivery cost is the same whatever the “origin” of the
mail product, its price ought to be the same for everyone anyway.
Third, we have solved this problem as if the regulator would control directly the
entrant’s price py. This is a technical simplification which is of no relevance in the
competitive fringe case where py = kE + pz so that when pz is set according to (12),
(13) is automatically satisfied. Finally, one can easily verify that with first-best prices,
operator I realizes a deficit equal to F I . Put differently, revenues do not cover fixed
costs and the first-best solution is not feasible when the operator is required to break
even. We now turn to the second best problem which arises when budget balancing is
imposed.
4 Second-best solution
Set py = kE + pz (competitive fringe) and maximize the welfare function subject to the
constraint that the incumbent realizes nonnegative profits. The Lagrangian is given by:
L = Vh (px) +
Z k
k
Vf (px, pz, py, k) + (1 + λ)π
I (px, pz, py) + π
E
9
where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the firms break-even constraint. Observe that






xf (px, py, k)g (k) dk
+(1 + λ)
·
X + [px − (c1 + c2)] ∂X
∂px



















y(pz + k, py, k)g (k) dk +
Z k
px−pz



































where dpy/dpz = 1. For the sake of interpretation it is interesting to redefine the demand
functions to account for the induced price variation of the entrant:
eX (px, pz) = X (px, pz, py (pz)) , (16)eY (px, pz) = Y (px, pz, py (pz)) , (17)eZ (px, pz) = Z (px, pz, py (pz)) , (18)
where py (pz) = kE+pz. Observe that these demand functions eX, eY and eZ only depend
on operator I’s prices which is convenient because these prices are the relevant decision
variables in our problem.
We show in the appendix that the FOC can be rearranged to yield the following
pricing rules:












where bσX and bσY+Z are the superelasticities of eX and eY + eZ respectively. These
expressions are the counterparts to equations (15) and (16) obtained by Billette de
Villemeur et al. (2003a) for the monopoly case. To interpret them, one has to recall
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first that superelasticities are generalized demand elasticities which account for cross-
price effects. When demand functions are independent, superelasticities are equal to
ordinary price elasticities. In that case (19) and (20) reduce to “inverse elasticity rules”.
However, in our setting demand functions are not independent. A variation in one of the
prices affects demand levels of the other goods and this brings about distortions which
are accounted for in the superelasticities. Observe that when the goods are substitutes
(as is the case here) one can show that superelasticities are smaller than ordinary price
elasticities.
In spite of this complication it remains that the pricing rules have the familiar
flavor and interpretation of Ramsey type rules. This point was made by Billette de
Villemeur et al. (2003a) for a monopoly setting. Here we obtain similar expressions
under competition. The main difference is that we have Y + Z rather than just Z in
the second expression. In either case this has to be interpreted as the total demand
for workshared mail which here also emanates from the competing operators. The
interesting feature is that while the incumbent’s and the entrant’s products are not
perfect substitutes (for the customers) they are here treated as if they were perfect
substitutes: only the sum of demands matters. This is because from operator I 0s
perspective the two types of mail are indistinguishable; they have the same marginal
cost (delivery only) and they are priced alike.
Combining these pricing expression, we can determined the second best worksharing
discount which is given by:






Under the plausible assumption that bσY+Z > bσX expression (21) implies that px−pz >
c1. Observe that the application of the ECPR rule would require the discount to equal
avoided costs, namely c1. This would amount to apply the tradeoff which warrants first-
best production efficiency. Not surprisingly this rule has to be amended in a second-
best setting and under plausible assumption on the demand elasticities one can expect
the discount to exceed avoided cost. Comparing this expression to its counterpart in
Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003a), namely equation (17) it appears that the presence
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of competition does not appear to fundamentally affect the structure of the pricing rule.
In either case, we obtain a rule which can be qualified as “ECPR, adjusted for demand
(super)elasticities”. This does of course not imply that the actual levels prices are the
same or are similar. The demand functions underlying the superelasticities are affected
by the presence of competition. We shall have a closer look at this issue for the special
case of perfect substitutes to which we now turn.
5 The case of perfect substitutes
We now turn to the special case where the incumbent and the entrant’s products are
perfect substitutes. Observe that this is the case on which Panzar (2003) concentrates.
Though extreme, this does not appear to be a totally meaningless setting to consider
here. One can argue that any degree of differentiation there may be between the two
operators is likely to be mitigated by the fact that operator I uses operator E’s delivery
network. In other words, once they get to the delivery segment the three products X,
Y and Z become indistinguishable.
With py = kE + pz (competitive fringe), the demand of type f customers has the
following properties:
xf = 0; y = 0; zk > 0 if k < inf
©
kE, px − pz
ª
xf = 0; y > 0 zk = 0; if kE < inf {k, px − pz}
xf > 0 y = 0; zk = 0; if px − pz < kE < k.
Observe that demand function are now discontinues when kE < px − pz = ek. To
determine the solution, two regimes have to be considered separately. We have either
kE ≤ ek (Regime I) or kE > ek (Regime II).
5.1 Regime I : kE ≤ ek
In this case, no customers of type f consume product x. The demand functions for the
incumbent products are:




zk(pz + k)g (k) dk.
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Figure 1: Case of perfect substitutes: demand of type f customers in Regimes I and
II.
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Remark that, since y and x (hence z) are perfect substitutes, yk (p) = zk (p) . As a
result, this is “as if” the entry of firm E were allowing firms with k ≥ kE to sort their
mail at a cost of only kE. Firm I is now facing a set of firms with a distribution of k
which is cut from above at the level kE and all these firm consume the workshared mail.
Appendix B shows that the optimal pricing rules are now given by

















Where εXh and εY+Z are ordinary price elasticities (absolute values). Observe that we
have returned to ordinary price elasticities rather than superelasticities which where
obtained in the general case. This is because, with perfect substitutes, cross-price
elasticities (between X on the one hand and Z + Y on the other hand) are zero within
a given regime.
5.2 Regime II : kE > ek
In the case where kE > px− pz, the demand for the operator E is zero and the demand
functions for the incumbent products are:
X (px, pz) = xh (px) +
Z k
px−pz
xf (px, k)g (k) dk
Z (px, pz) =
Z px−pz
k
z(pz + k, k)g (k) dk
and we are back to the model of worksharing. Optimal pricing rules are then given by
expressions (15) and (17) in Billette de Villemeur and al. (2003a).
5.3 Which Regime is relevant?
The condition defining the applicable regime depends on ek and thus on the prices.
Formally, one would have to evaluate welfare at the solutions achieved in either regime
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and compare welfare levels to determine the global optimum. This is a complicated task
and the problem cannot be done based on the first order conditions alone. However, it is
quite clear that the solution will depend on the relative efficiency of the two operator’s
on segment 1, i.e. on the comparison between kEand c1.
The first interesting property one can show is that when kE ≤ c1 Regime II can not
occur. In other words, it is never optimal to (totally) exclude an efficient competitor
from the market. To see that, recall from Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003a) that
Regime II yields ek = px − pz > c1, hence kE ≤ c1 is incompatible with the condition
for Regime II namely kE > ek.
By continuity, this property implies that when kE > c1, but not “too large”, Regime
I will continue to prevail. In other words, at the second best optimum, it may be
interesting to “tolerate” a competitor who is slightly less efficient than the incumbent
(even though its product is a perfect substitute to that of operator I). This is because
the presence of E allows for a solution which differentiates between firms with high k
(who will consume Y ) and households (who consume X). If the competitor is not in
the market, both of these groups consume X at a uniform price.
Finally, when kE become sufficiently large the solution will imply Regime II; there
is no room at a second best optimum for a very inefficient entrant.
5.4 Discounts under monopoly and under competition
Having characterized the solution under competition we can now attempt to compare
it to the monopoly case. In particular it is interesting to study how the worksharing
discount px−pz is affected by the presence of the competitor. To do this we shall remain
within the setting of perfect substitutes.
Not surprisingly, the answer depends (among other things) on the cost of the entrant
kE . To see this let us start from the monopoly solution denoted pmx and p
m
z , withekm = pmx − pmz . We know from Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003b) that ekm > c1
(under plausible assumptions on demand elasticities). Depending on the entrant’s cost
we can then have three configurations. First, there is the rather trivial case where
the entrant has large preparation costs, kE ≥ ekm. In that case, we have Regime II
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and monopoly prices (and discounts) will continue to prevail. Second and at the other
extreme, we can have kE < c1, which of course implies kE < ekm. As shown in the
previous subsection Regime I prevails and the solution is given by (22) and (23). To
compare these to their monopoly counterparts, expressions (15) and (16) of Billette de
Villemeur et al. (2003b), we have to assess the impact of the presence of the competitor
on the demand elasticities. Roughly speaking, the firms with the larger k (which are
also the ones with the relatively less elastic demand) consume x under monopoly and
y (and thus indirectly also z) under competition. It is quite clear that this tends to
make the demand for X less elastic ( as the consumers) with the more elastic demand
switch to Y.8 Consequently, we can expect px to increase.9 Furthermore, the switching
consumers have smaller elasticities than the low k firms. Consequently, they will cause
the elasticity for Z to be lower than in the monopoly case. But then pz would also tend
to increase and the overall impact on ek appears to be ambiguous.10
Finally, there is the case where c1 ≤ kE ≤ ekm. In words, the entrant’s preparation
cost is between that of the incumbent and the monopoly level of the worksharing dis-
count. In particular, consider the case where kE = ekm − ε, where ε > 0 is small. Now,
if operator I maintains its monopoly prices, all consumers to the right of ekm will switch
from x to y (while essentially nothing else changes). With kE > c1 this switch can only
decrease welfare (because total preparation costs increase). This welfare loss can easily
be avoided when operator I changes its prices to reduce ek to a level below kE . Since
ε is small and since we start from a optimal solution, this variation will have no first
order impact on welfare. It does, however, avoid the increase in preparation cost. Con-
sequently, it will clearly dominate the status quo (maintaining monopoly prices upon
entry) with higher preparation costs. To sum up, in this case we can conclude unam-
biguously that competition decreases the level of the discount. Now, as ε increases, so
8Tthe demand of firms with high preparation cost is expected to be nevertheless more elastic than
that of houselholds.
9This is a very rough argument of course because the monopoly expression involve superelasticities.
Our arguement assumes thus implicitely that cross-price effects are not too significiant.
10All these arguments are for a given level of λ. In reality λ would of course change. Practically
speaking this means that when both prices increase (starting from the Ramsey solution) we can expect
profits to increase. But then prices can again be lowered without violating the break-even constraint.
This introduces yet another effect which of course does not make the result any less ambiguous.
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that kE will become closer and closer to c1, we can continue to make this argument.
However, the price adjustment need to match kE become larger and larger and this will
also imply a welfare loss. This has to be balanced against the reduction in preparation
cost (which becomes of course smaller and smaller as kE approaches c1). Thus at some
point we will switch to Regime I and return to case where the impact on ek is ambiguous.
6 Concluding remarks
The current regulatory debate in the postal sector calls for an in depth study of the
appropriate pricing rules in a competitive environment. Such an investigation has to
encompass both worksharing discounts granted to customers and the pricing of the mail
which is prepared by competitors but delivered by the incumbent postal operator. Build-
ing on our earlier paper which had studied the pricing of worksharing under monopoly,
we have provided a framework which is suitable to jointly study access and worksharing
in a liberalized industry. However, in the current paper we have not fully explored the
potential of our framework. We have looked only at one of the possible scenarios and
probably one of the simplest. The natural next steps would be for instance to introduce
bypass (in delivery), to consider delivery areas with different costs, etc. This is left for
future research.
In the meantime we can already learn from our partial results that the optimal prices
are not going to be determined according to simple ad hoc rules which moreover would be
valid in all circumstances. The pricing rules are complex in the sense that many factors,
including demand, cost and regulatory rules will matter. We have already discussed
the role of the entrant sorting cost kE in the previous section. More interestingly, one
can easily see that the arguments used to asses the impact of entry on the worksharing
discount (in Subsection 5.4) crucially depend on the requirement the same pz applies
to both to operator E and to customers. The impact of bypass can be expected to be
even more significant. As long as there is no bypass operator I set positive markups on
all products, including the one sold by competitors to finance its fixed cost. The other
operators’ products are of course only “taxed” indirectly, through the access charge.
However, as long the operator E has no delivery network this is of no relevance. With
17
the possibility of bypass, on the other hand, it is more difficult or maybe even impossible
to realize markups on the competitor’s products. Summing up, the main conclusion to
be drawn is thus that the impact of liberalization is very difficult to assess and will very
much depend on the exact (competitive) environment which is considered.
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A Derivation of expressions (19) and ( 20)




















































Using (16)—(18) and (24)—(26), the FOCs can be rewritten as:
∂L
∂px
= λX + (1 + λ)
·
[px − (c1 + c2)] ∂X
∂px











= λ (Z + Y ) + (1 + λ)
"
[px − (c1 + c2)] ∂
eX
∂pz









which gives the “standard” Ramsey-like system:























(Z + Y ) + [px − (c1 + c2)] ∂
eX/∂pz³




























































which is easily be solved to yield successively








































































































































































































Rearranging these expressions and defining superelasticities in the usual way:
bσX = εXσY+Z − σXZσ(Z+Y )X
σY+Z + σXZbσY+Z = σY+ZεX − σXZσ(Z+Y )X
εX + σ(Z+Y )X
.
yields expression (19) and (20). To simplify the expression we have used the property









= xf (px, py,ek)g ³ek´+ Z k
px−pz
∂xf (px, py, k)
∂py
g (k) dk



















which in turn arises because.






and which implies pz (Z + Y )σ(Z+Y )X = pxXσXZ .
B Derivation of expressions (22) and (23)



























Using these properties to simplify the FOCs (27) and (28) one obtains
∂L
∂px













which can easily be rearranged to yield (22) and (23).
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